1 Labor markets, Inequality and Income Distribution in Transition

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<ul><li> Slide 1 </li> <li> 1 Labor markets, Inequality and Income Distribution in Transition </li> <li> Slide 2 </li> <li> 2 I. Labor Markets 1. The Labor in the Command Era characteristics major element was education, especially technical training, the transition started with major stock of human capital The issue in transition is how to use the human capital in very different environmental setting. full employment-underemployment in a setting where the dismissal of workers, whether productive or not was generally difficult wage differentials were used to reward differential inputs and to motivate effort, but even so the outcome was generally egalitarian, compared with market economies But the distribution of income changed as mkt arrangements were introduced during the 1990s. </li> <li> Slide 3 </li> <li> 3 2. The labor in transition conflict between labor market adjustment and command economy "job right constraint" (full employment) distribution of income changed sharply Movement of labor from state sector to private sector; considerable unemployment created. As a result of transition or structural changes the unemployment has increased. Reasons for increase in unemployment rate in transition decreased state employment (closure of state enterprises) decreased private employment (closure of private enterprises) job quitters entry into unemployment the imposition of hard budget problem of financing unemployment benefits The transition economies have generally developed system of unemployment compensations. These programs differ from country to country and have been typically more generous in EE than in the FSU. With high unemployment rate poverty becomes a greater treat. </li> <li> Slide 4 </li> <li> 4 Aghion-Blanchard model On the Speed of Transition Aghion P. &amp; O. Blanchard, NBER Paper 1994; State firms that dominated the econ. are struggling with mkt forces. A new private sector quickly emerged. Unemployment which did not exist is high and increasing. Model analyzes the movement of labor from the former state sector to the private sector; the levels of unemployment and change in wages. It includes: a) The speed with which production and hence inputs will be transferred from the state to the emerging private sector. b) The nature of the mechanisms involved changes in wage level in the declining state sector and in the emerging private sector, and the level of unemployment. The speed with which labor can be released from the state sector and absorbed into the emerging private sector depends in part on wages in both sectors. Unemployment can lead to lower wages, therefore, increased demand in private sector. </li> <li> Slide 5 </li> <li> 5 Model: Relative cost and demand changes with hardening the budget constraint have forced firms to substantially reduce employment. The same relative cost and demand changes have led to a rapid initial increase in private employment (small scale trade and services) but further growth of private sector is constrained by lack of expertise and external finance. The net effect of these changes has been an increase in unemployment that affects the speed of restructuring and rate of private sector growth. The increase in private sector employment has not offset the decrease in state employment E+N+U=1 labor force E-state sector employment; N- private sector employment; U-unemployment </li> <li> Slide 6 </li> <li> 6 Before transition E=1 and N=U=0 During transition: State sector-restructuring, decrease in employment New private sector-increase in employment Job creation Private wages depend on labor mkt conditions Higher unemployment lower wages faster private job creation Higher unemployment unemployment benefits higher taxes per worker c.p. decrease in private job creation. Unemployment and speed of restructuring (s) When the firm restructures it reduces employment to workers The flow into unemployment s(1-) depends on the speed of restructuring and the proportion of workers loosing their jobs in the process The flow out of unemployment is equal to the private job creation, H Private job creation depends on unemployment thought 2 channels-wages and taxes: The higher unemployment, the lower is the wage. Hence, higher private job creation the higher unemployment, the higher are taxes. Hence, lower private job creation As unemployment increases, the effect that dominates initially is the direct effect on wages, so that private job creation increases; as unemployment gets sufficiently large, the effect on taxes dominates, and private job creation declines. </li> <li> Slide 7 </li> <li> 7 Figure 1 The authors characterize the dynamics of unemployment; the flow into unemployment is a horizontal line s(1-). Two conclusions: 1. There is a max speed of restructuring (s). If s is such that s(1-) exceeds the max rate of private job creation, therefore, the transition eventually fails. Starting from low unemployment (U), private job creation is initially positive and increasing. But it remains smaller than the flow into unemployment, coming from restructuring, and the U becomes so large that the taxes are increasing. Private job creation declines leading to a faster increase in U. At p. C the fiscal burden is large than the new and the privatized sectors become unprofitable and close down. The conclusion is too fast a rate of restructuring can lead to too high level of U, that will lead to a collapse of the private sector. 2. Figure 1there are two equilibriums Ua and Ub. Ua is stable equilibrium, Ub is unstable. Uo is initial level of U. If the initial net decrease in employment is so large that Uo is to the right Ub, then private job creation insufficient to avoid a further increase in U and eventually collapse of private sector. But as long as Uo is less than Ub, the economy converges to the lower level of unemployment Ua. At Ua, flows in are equal to flows out, the private sector grows steadily from two sources, restructuring/privatization (s) and private job creation (H). Unemployment remains at Ua until restructuring has been achieved and the state sector has been fully transformed. </li> <li> Slide 8 </li> <li> 8 </li> <li> Slide 9 </li> <li> 9 Equilibrium rate of unemployment and speed of restructuringthe flow into unemployment from restructuring is just absorbed by the rate of private job creationp. A The model implies that the initial adjustment can lead to initial unemployment rate that exceeds the equilibrium rate. In that case restructuring does not take place until job creation has reduced unemployment to low levels. If unemployment is high and private creation slow, this adjustment will take a while. Policy implication the initial phase of adjustment, priority should be given to private job creation. Trying to increase the speed of restructuring may not be feasible (opposition of workers in state firms). Poland The evidence suggests that unemployment that has resulted from labor shedding far exceeds equilibrium unemployment. The exit rate from unemployment to employment is extremely low; private wages are lower than wages in state firms. It is not surprising that workers in most state firms are resisting restructuring and the associated risks of unemployment. The model forecasts that the restructuring will remain limited until private job creation has sufficiently reduced the unemployment rate to make restructuring less unattractive. In major cities unemployment is lowerlabor mkts are closer to equilibrium unemployment. </li> <li> Slide 10 </li> <li> 10 3. Empirical Evidence: Value of human capital in transition to market: Evidence from Slovenia, P. Orazem and M. Vodopivec, European Econ Review 41. Goal: How transition has altered returns to human capital? It focuses on changes of labor mobility and wage structure. Human Capital and Labor Market Transitions Changes in patterns of mobility--identifying the determinants of exit from both unemployment and employment (multinomial logit and hazard models) Educationmore educated, more likely to find a job; the share of university graduates among unemployed declined Experiencethe least experienced group faced significantly higher probability of job loss </li> <li> Slide 11 </li> <li> 11 Human Capital and Transition Wages Dramatic changes in the structure of earnings Returns to educationaverage returns to years of education rose relative to earnings of the least educated group Returns to experiencereturns to the most experienced rise relative to those with the least experience, for men and women. Conclusions Transition dramatically increased the wage and employment premium attached to skilled labor. More educated workers have not only experienced an increase in relative wages, but they have experienced greater relative success in switching jobs, lower probability of layoff, and better chance of finding a job if unemployed. The increase in the premium to job experience is much less pronounced than for education, but still shows up in higher probability of exit from unemployment to job and in lower probability of exit from employment to unemployment. Relative wages have grown dramatically for the most educated. </li> <li> Slide 12 </li> <li> 12 Winners and Losers in Russias Economic Transition, E. Brainerd, American econ Review 88(1998): 10-94-1116 Goalto answer the questions: Have Russian workers benefited from the changes?, Who are the winners and losers of the transition?, Is increased inequality in Russia real? Data-cross-section household surveys conducted before and after the transition Findings: a) Overall wage inequality nearly doubled 1991-1994 and reached a level higher than that in the US b) Returns to both measured skills (education, occupation) and unmeasured skills within groups have increased. c) Relative wages for older workers have declined d) Wages of women relative to men have declined e) The winners-young well-educated men; the losers-older workers (men) and women </li> <li> Slide 13 </li> <li> 13 II. Human capital-demographic characteristics Human capital endowment was and remains high by international standards in the transition economies, even though its skill mix may not always correspond optimally to the requirements of a market economy. Despite a temporary negative effect of the transition processparticularly in western CIS countries, where indicators of life expectancy and adult mortality have worsened since the onset of transition 1.Health and education conditions are generally still favorable compared with other countries at similar levels of income 2.Demographic patterns -life-expectancy in transition countries decreased dramatically and recovered modestly. increase in death rates and decrease in birth rates these patterns have been much more severe in CIS than CEE </li> <li> Slide 14 </li> <li> 14 III. Social problems 1. Increased poverty Definition-it is necessary to establish a poverty line in terms of appropriate variable, such as income, health conditions Measurement-means determining what portion of the population is in poverty and thus fall falls below the established minimum Incidence of poverty is significant in CIS &amp; less significant in CEE 2. Problem of maintaining adequate spending on health, education and pensions. The command economies provide significant social programs, the modes of adjustment (e.g. increasing unemployment, severe inflation, increase in retirement) created pressure on available benefit programs. 3. Income inequality increased during early years of transition </li> <li> Slide 15 </li> <li> 15 Impacts of Economic Reform in Poland; Incidence and Welfare Changes within a Consistent Framework, Huffman S.&amp; S. Johnson, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 86, 2, May, 2004 Goalhow do households adjust their behavior when the opportunity sets of consumption goods change? How do consumption patterns change in response to increased variety of goods? Are the households better off or worse off under the new system? This study focuses on the consequences of removing rationing for demands of goods and for the household consumption patterns generally and then on welfare. Welfare implications of the transition are derived from a model of household consumption that explicitly reflects the effects of rationing. </li> <li> Slide 16 </li> <li> 16 In answering the question of how consumption patterns change we have to consider the following: Increased availability of consumption goods: quantity &amp; variety. What did household's "resources buy" before and after the reforms (change in the households budget constraint) Consumer patterns during the transition in Poland Decrease expenditure share on food, clothing and footwear Increase expenditure share on fuel, electricity, transport, communication and other goods Growing demand for housing and durables </li> <li> Slide 17 </li> <li> 17 Empirical specification The final specification of the equations for estimating of the AIDS with virtual prices is where i = 1,..., n goods, and t = 1,..., T observations. The standard demand system is </li> <li> Slide 18 </li> <li> 18 Calculation of virtual prices Definition-the price at which the consumer voluntarily chooses the rationed level external prices- from Germany Hausman method for calculating virtual prices. Data Polish Household Budget Survey 1987 1992 Variables-the budgeted shares for six expenditure groups food alcohol and tobacco clothing and footwear housing fuel, electricity, communication, and transportation other </li> <li> Slide 19 </li> <li> 19 Findings The results show that over 1987 to 1992 the CLI, ignoring the rationing effects, is biased upward from 1.53 to 3.71 percentage points per year. Compared to the estimates of welfare loss that neglect the rationing effects during the prereform period, the estimated welfare losses that reflect the rationing are reduced by 50 percent using Hausmans virtual prices and by 75 percent using external proxy virtual prices. The Incidence of Impacts of Transition for Selected Household Groups </li> <li> Slide 20 </li> <li> 20 </li> <li> Slide 21 </li> <li> 21 </li> <li> Slide 22 </li> <li> 22 </li> <li> Slide 23 </li> <li> 23 Returns to skills and the speed of reforms: evidence from Central and Eastern Europe, China and Russia, Fleisher B, K. Sabirianova and X. Wang. Journal of Comparative Economics 2005, 33. I. Introduction. Econ reformsenterprises operate under fewer constraints. Therefore, returns to schooling should have increased. The time path of returns to schooling has not been uniform. Studies of CEE and Russia (CEER) indicate a trend for returns to schooling to rise almost immediately after reform, but at different speeds. Studies of China in the period covering approximately the first 15 years of its econ transition report low rates of return to schooling. Post-reform time paths of major economic variables were also quite different In China, a relatively small proportion of workers experienced declining real incomes in the early transition whereas, in CEER, the op...</li></ul>