Positive Theory

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Positive Theory

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<ul><li> 1. POSITIVE THEORY ANDCAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH</li></ul> <p> 2. PHILOSOPHY of POSITIVEACCOUNTING THEORYPhilosophy Teori positif dikeluarkan untuk memahami fenomena-fenomenaakuntansi dengan mengamati kejadian secara empiris dan hasilpengamatan tersebut digunakan untuk membuat prediksi kejadiandi masa akan datang.Milton Friedman: Tujuan teori positif adalah mengembangakan teori atau hipotesayang menghasilkan prediksi yang valid dan bermakna untukprediksi atau phenomena yang belum pernah diamati.Watt &amp; Zimmerma : Tujuan teori positif adalah memprediksi dan menjelaskan praktekakuntansi 3. PHILOSOPHY of POSITIVEACCOUNTING THEORYAsumsi mengenai perilaku individu :Para manajer, investor dan lender merupakan orang-orangyang rasional, menginginkan adanya keuntungan dari sisifinansialManajer bisa memilih metode akuntansi yang secara langsungmemaksimalkan kepentingan pribadinya atau merubahkebijakan yang berkaitan dengan pendanaan dan produksiyang secara tidak langsung mensejahterakan dirinya sendiriManajer memaksimalkan nilai perusahaan 4. STRENGTHS of POSITIVETHEORY Menghasilkan hipotesis melalui pengujian empiris Memberi pemahaman tentang bagaimana dunia ini bekerja Memberi pemahaman mengenai kaitan antara akuntansi danharga saham Berusaha memberi pemahaman mengenai kaitan antarainformasi akuntansi, manajer perusahaan dan pasar sertamenganalisa hubungannya 5. SCOPE of POSITIVEACCOUNTING THEORYPenelitian dampak akuntansi dan perilakupasar modal.Pengembanganteori akuntansiMenjelaskan dan memprediksi praktek akuntansidalam perusahaan. Usaha untuk menjelaskan apakah perusahaan menggunakanmetode akuntansi tertentu untuk alasan oportunistik. Contohnyamemindahkan kesejahteraan milik pemegang saham ke tanganmanajer. Perspektif mengenai oportunistik ini sering disebut expost. Mengasumsikan perusahaan memilih praktek akuntansi untukalasan efisiensi. Sehingga kebijakan akuntansi ditempatkansebagai ex ante untuk menurunkan biaya kontrak antaraperusahaan dan pemegang saham.positif : 6. CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCHand THE EFFICIENT MARKETSHYPOTHESIS Studi yang berusaha menentukan dampakperilisan informasi keuangan terhadap returnsaham Studi yang memikirkan efek dari perubahankebijakan akuntansi terhadap harga sahamPenelitian pasarmodal yang secarakhusus pentingterhadap teoriakuntansi positif: efficient markets hypothesis (EMH).Sebagian besarpenelitianmengenai hal inimengarah padasatu paradigmaekonomi 7. CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCHand THE EFFICIENT MARKETSHYPOTHESISPasar efisien, asumsi:Tidak ada biaya transaksi dalamperdagangan sekuritasInformasi disediakan secara cuma-cumabagi seluruh peserta pasarAda perjanjian mengenai dampakinformasi saat ini terhadap hargasekarang dan pendistribusian hargapada masa yang akan datang 8. CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCHand THE EFFICIENT MARKETSHYPOTHESISMacamInformasiWeakStrong Semistrong 9. CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCHand THE EFFICIENT MARKETSHYPOTHESISSementara EMH adalah teoritentang mekanisme hargapada pasar sekuritas,VSCapital market research(CMR) adalah penelitianempiris yang menggunakanmetode statistik untukmenguji hipotesis yangberkaitan dengan perilakupasar modal. KebanyakanCMR menggunakan marketmodel. 10. CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCHand THE EFFICIENT MARKETSHYPOTHESISAsumsi dalam market model: Investor merupakan risk-averse Return didistribusikan secara normaldan para investor memilih portofoliomereka sendiri Investor memiliki ekspektasi yangsama Merupakan pasar sempurna 11. DAMPAK PENGUMUMAN LABAAKUNTANSI TERHADAP HARGA SAHAMSalah satu tujuan teori akuntansi positif adalah mempelajariinformasi yang dimiliki laba akuntansi terhadap harga saham.Ball &amp; Brown melakukan pengujian terhadap manfaat labahistorical cost bagi investor.Peningkatan laba akuntansi yang tidak diestimasi sebelumnyamerupakan informasi baru bagi investor. Dalam pasar modalefisien, setiap perubahan aliran kas dari yang diharapkan akanmempengaruhi harga saham. 12. PENGARUH PENELITIAN INFORMASILABA TERHADAP HARGA SAHAM ( BALL&amp; BROWNS)Laba akuntansihistoris mengandunginformasi yangcukup berarti.Dari hasil penelitiandiketahui adanyainformasi yangberkelanjutan dipasar, jadi akuntansibukan satu-satunyainformasi mengenaiperusahaan.Pasar secarakonsistenmengantisipasiinformasi laporanakuntansi. 13. KETIDAK SEIMBANGANINFORMASI DAN BESARNYAPERUSAHAANKandungan informasi pengumuman laba yang tidak diharapkanmungkin berlawanan dengan ukuran perusahaan.Semakin kecil perusahaan, semakin banyak informasi yangterkandung pada perusahaan.Argumentasi yang diberikan Freeman: Perusahaan memberikan informasi yang lebih bervariasi Perusahaan besar mempunyai tingkat informasi yang lebih besar yangdilakukan oleh para peneliti dan pemberitaan.Investor institusi umumnya lebih menyukai bertransaksi denganperusahaan besar, untuk alasan likuiditas dan masalah kontrak. 14. BEBERAPA FAKTOR YANGMEMPENGARUHI EARNING RESPONCOEFICIENTRisikodanketidakpastianFaktorKualitasauditIndustriTingkatBungaLabapermanenTingkatPertumbuFinancialLeveragehanPerusahaandantemporer 15. STRATEGI PERDAGANGAN Perubahaninformasi setelahpengumuman Winner-losserstrategies dansikap optimispara analiskeuangan.Berdasarkanbukti empiristernyatapasar dapatdipengaruhidataakuntansi 16. MECHANISTIC OR BEHAVIOURALEFFECT Cosmetic accountingLeftwich Two hypothesesMarket reacted mechanistically to changes inaccounting numbers, regardless whether they werecosmetic or whether they had cash flow implicationsMarket ignored accounting changes which had nocash flow consequences 17. MECHANISTIC OR BEHAVIOURALEFFECTManipulatingaccountingnumbers: 18. MECHANISTIC OR BEHAVIOURALEFFECTDetecting the quality and probability of accountingmanagement : 19. A POSITIVE THEORYOF ACCOUNTINGDISCRETION 20. BACKGROUND: EARLY DEMANDFOR THEORYCapital markets researchinconclusiveObservations ofaccounting policy choice Why do managers preparefinancial reports? How are accounting policychoices made?Information hypothesiscould not explain allobservations 21. CONTRACTING THEORYThe firm as a legal nexus ofcontractual relationshipsOrganising economic activityto reduce contracting costs management contracts debt contracts 22. AGENCY THEORYJensen &amp; Meckling(1976)Contract where oneparty (the principal)engages another(the agent) to acton their behalfe.g. where there is aseparation ofmanagement andcontrol. Managershave remunerationcontractsUtility maximisationby both partiesAgent may act onher/his own behalf(self-interest) 23. AGENCY THEORYFirms can be characterised as a nexus ofcontracts Between consumers of products and the suppliers offactors of productionFirms exist because they reduce contractingcosts, Firms provide an efficient means of organising economicactivityContracts include all types of agreementsbetween two or more parties 24. AGENCY THEORYAgency costsDue to self interest, the agent might act in his/her owninterest rather than that of the principal (moral hazard)Agents may undertake certain Divergent BehavioursThis agency problem gives rise to Agency Costs(monitoring, bonding and residual loss) 25. AGENCY THEORYAgency costs can be categorised into:1. Monitoring Costs the cost of observing theagents behaviour Auditing costs2. Bonding Costs Costs borne by the agent(e.g. manager) as a result of aligning theirinterests with the principal (e.g. owners) Manager has to prepare financial reports (a cost tothe manager in terms of time and effort) 26. AGENCY THEORYAgency costs can be categorised into(continued):3. Residual Loss loss associated with notbeing able to fully align the interests of theprincipal with the agent 27. AGENCY THEORY The principal reduces theremuneration paid to the agent inanticipation of agency costs Cost of dysfunctional behaviourbuilt into remunerationPriceProtection (exante up front) The principal reduces theremuneration paid to the agent Remuneration based on observedagent performanceEx post settlingup (ex post after the facte.g. at the endof each year) 28. MANAGER-SHAREHOLDERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPSManagers asagents ofowners canact in owninterestThe smallerthe managerownership inthe firm themore likelydivergentbehavioursManager hasincentive tocontract withfirm toreducedivergentbehavioursto reducepriceprotectionManagerbear cost ofownermonitoring 29. MANAGER-SHAREHOLDERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPSAgencyCosts ofEquityRisk-Aversion limited incentive toincrease value offirm throughinvestment in riskyprojectsDividendRetention reduced incentiveto pay dividends ortake on optimallevels of debtOver-consumptionofPerquisitesHorizonProblem short term focus onperformance of firm 30. MANAGER-SHAREHOLDERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPSReducing the agency costs of equity Bonuses are usually tied to firmperformance in some way to motivatemanagers to act in the owners interest Bonuses can be paid in cash and/orshares/share optionsBonuses can be tied to:1. Accounting numbers(such as netincome, sales, return on assets)2. Share price (market based performancemeasure) 31. SHAREHOLDER-DEBTHOLDERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS Excessive dividend payments-reducingdebtholders security Asset substitution-firm invests inhigher risk projects (no benefit todebtholder) Under investment-where noincentive to invest in positive NPVprojects Claim dilution-issuing higherpriority debtAgencycostsof debt 32. SHAREHOLDER-DEBTHOLDERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS Debt-holders can Price Protect viaincreased interest charges or reducedamounts provided The interests of shareholders can bebonded to those of debtholders viarestrictions in lending agreements (LoanCovenants) Covenants often rely on numbers containedin financial statements Covenants usually restrict the behaviour ofmanagers acting on behalf of owners 33. EX POST OPPORTUNISM VERSUSEX ANTE EFFICIENTCONTRACTING Contracts provide incentives for agents toact against principals interestOpportunistic perspectiveex post (after contracts finalised)incomplete contractsbonus plan hypothesisdebt-equity hypothesis Efficient contracting perspective 34. EX POST OPPORTUNISM VERSUSEX ANTE EFFICIENTCONTRACTINGEfficient contracting perspectiveEfficientcontractsaligninterests ofagent withprincipalActions thatbenefit agentalso benefitfirmEx ante beforecontracts arefinalised 35. INFORMATION PERSPECTIVEAND SIGNALLINGHolthausenDerivedfromsignallingtheoryManagersprovideinformationto investorsto assist intheirdecisionmakingSimilar toefficientcontractingAccountinginformationprecedescash flows 36. INFORMATION PERSPECTIVEAND SIGNALLINGAligned with the information hypothesisManagers use the accounts to signalexpectations and intentions regarding the futureIncentives to signal good, neutral and bad news 37. POLITICAL PROCESSESThe firm and parties interestedin the firmPolitical market v. capitalmarket Less demand for information in politicalmarket Less benefit from information gathering Heterogeneity of interests 38. POLITICAL PROCESSESPolitical costs wealth transfers Size hypothesisImplications for firm behaviour e.g. banking sector in Australia 39. EMPIRICAL TESTSTesting the opportunistic andpolitical cost hypothesisWatts &amp;ZimmermanZmijewski &amp;Hagermanprovided littleinsight 40. EMPIRICAL TESTSEmpirical tests tests using contract details(Healy)Figure 10.1: Allocation of funds to the bonus pool,based on accounting profit 41. EMPIRICAL TESTSEmpirical tests tests using contract details(Healy)Figure 10.2: Accounting accruals as a function ofbonus plan specifications 42. EMPIRICAL TESTSRefining the specificationof political costs Liberty &amp; Zimmerman Godfrey &amp; Jones DeAngelo Wong Lemke &amp; Page Panchapakesan &amp; McKinnon Ali &amp; Kumar 43. EMPIRICAL TESTSTests ofefficientcontractinghypothesesinterest capitalisationvoluntary consolidatedfinancial reportingchanges in CEOother studies 44. EVALUATION OF THE THEORYMethodological and statistical criticisms empirical evidence weak and inconclusive McKee, Bell &amp; Boatsman Christie Leftwich 45. EVALUATION OF THE THEORYPhilosophical criticismsTinker, Merino and NeimarkChristensonWatts and Zimmerman </p>